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IP & Media Law Updates

| 3 minute read
Reposted from Advertising Law Updates

Tracy Anderson vs. Megan Roup - Round 2

This is an update on the lawsuit between fitness guru Tracy Anderson and her former employee (and current competitor) Megan Roup, which I covered in this post.

The back story surely must be more complex and interesting (see this). But, in a nutshell, when Roup quit working for Anderson and set up her own fitness business, Anderson expressed her displeasure by suing her former colleague for breach of contract, copyright infringement, false advertising under the Lanham Act, and violations of California's unfair competition law ("UCL"). Last December, Senior District Judge Ronald S. W. Lew (C.D. Cal.) denied Roup's motion to dismiss the copyright and breach of contract claims but agreed with Roup that Anderson had failed to properly plead false advertising and UCL claims. The court gave Anderson leave to amend those claims.

Intensity and tenacity are characteristics you would expect from a trainer like Tracy Anderson. Yet, Anderson never got around to amending her complaint. No explanation is given by the court. As a result, last month, Judge Philip Gutierrez (to whom the case was assigned upon Judge Lew's death) granted Roup's motion to dismiss the false advertising and UCL claims with prejudice and granted Roup's special motion to strike the UCL claim under California's anti-SLAPP statute. 

FRCP 41(b)

provides that if “the plaintiff fails to prosecute or to comply with these rules or a court order, then a defendant may move to dismiss the action or any claim against it.” In the Ninth Circuit, dismissal of claims with prejudice for failure to comply with a court order allowing amendment is considered a sanction, and the district court must consider five factors to determine whether dismissal is appropriate: “(1) the public’s interest in expeditious resolution of litigation; (2) the court’s need to manage its docket; (3) the risk of prejudice to the defendants; (4) the public policy favoring disposition of cases on their merits; and (5) the availability of less drastic alternatives.” Here, the court concluded that the first three factors favored dismissal, and the fourth factor was essentially neutral because Anderson had provided no explanation for her failure to amend. This was enough, in the court's view, to warrant dismissal with prejudice.

The court also granted Roup's anti-SLAPP motion to strike. California's anti-SLAPP statute provides for a special motion to strike a cause of action that arises from the defendant's "right of petition or free speech under the United States or California Constitution in connection with a public issue." Cal. Civ. Proc. Code § 425.16(b)(1). In determining whether to grant an anti-SLAPP motion to strike, courts engage in a two-step process. First, the defendant must make an initial prima facie showing that the cause of action is one arising from protected activity covered by the statute. If the defendant meets that threshold, the burden then shifts to the plaintiff who must demonstrate a probability that she will prevail on the claim. 

At the outset, the court held that the special motion to strike was not moot, even though the UCL claim had been dismissed, since a defendant who prevails on an anti–SLAPP motion is entitled to recover mandatory attorney’s fees. The court suggested that it might have reached a different conclusion had Anderson amended the complaint to exclude the UCL claim or notified the court that it was not going to amend.

Next, the court found that Roup had properly alleged that the conduct that was the subject of the UCL claim involved protected speech about a public issue. Specifically, Anderson alleged in her complaint that Roup had published statements on her website in which she falsely took credit for developing an exercise method (the TSS Method) that, according to Anderson, was based on Anderson's own proprietary method (the Tracy Anderson Method). (See this prior post for more details.) The court found that Roup had properly pled that she was a public persona (since she is a celebrity fitness trainer and influencer with a substantial number of followers on social media) and that the statements at issue were biographical and, therefore, were "concern[ing] a person or entity in the public eye." Next (and no shocker here), since the court already held that Anderson had not pled a plausible UCL claim, she could not demonstrate a probability of prevailing on that claim. 

Round 2 clearly goes too Roup. However, the false advertising and UCL claims are (IMHO) the least interesting parts of this case. If the case doesn't settle, I look forward to seeing how the court rules on the copyright claims (can Anderson demonstrate that she has a valid copyright in the exercise choreography that is part of the Tracy Anderson Method?) and breach of contract claims (did Roup violate confidentiality obligations pursuant to her employment contracts when she launched the TSS Method?).

Tracy Anderson Mind & Body, LLC vs. Roup, 22-cv-04735-PSG-E (C.D. Cal. June 12, 2023)

Tags

false advertising, unfair competition, copyright, slapp, advertising